On March 28, 1978, the US Supreme Court issued its decision in Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), and held that a district court judge was immune from lawsuit even after approving the involuntary sterilization of a minor.

The facts of the case went something like this:

A mother filed a petition in a common pleas court in Indiana to have her mentally handicapped 15-year-old daughter sterilized. The judge approved the mother’s petition, and did so without holding a hearing on the matter, giving notice to the 15-year old daughter, or appointing a guardian ad litem for the child’s best interests. The mother then took her mentally handicapped daughter to the doctor’s office, had her sterilized so she couldn’t have children, and told her daughter that she was just having her appendix removed.

Around two years later the daughter got married, and realized she couldn’t have kids because she had been sterilized. The daughter (and her husband) filed a lawsuit in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (i.e. § 1983 action) based on her alleged deprivation of rights under the US Constitution and federal law (i.e. the right to conceive children). The daughter filed the lawsuit against her mother, the mother's attorney, the judge who allowed the sterilization, the doctors who performed the sterilization, and the hospital where it was performed, in which she sought monetary damages.

The case eventually made its way to the US Supreme Court. By the time the case reached the Court, the main issue was whether the judge was liable to lawsuit by the daughter for allowing the sterilization.

The Court began its analysis by stating that a § 1983 action requires state action. In other words, only individuals that act for or on behalf of the government are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. So, all the defendants besides the judge were automatically not liable because none of them were acting for or on behalf of any government agency. The remaining question was whether the judge was liable as a state actor.

The Court held in a 5-3 decision (Justice Brennan did not take part in the decision) that the judge was immune from lawsuit by the daughter based on the doctrine of judicial immunity. The Court recognized that a fundamental principal of being a judge is the ability to exercise his or her authority and do so free from personal lawsuits – otherwise, judges would refrain from issuing any sentences where individuals could sue them.

The Court highlighted that judicial immunity is one of the most basic rules in the judicial system. The Court further stated that a judge can only be liable for his or her action on the bench if he or she acted in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” However, the mere fact that tragic consequences resulted from the judge’s decision did deprive the judge of his judicial immunity.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Potter Stewart argued that the judge’s actions did not preclude him from lawsuit by the daughter simply because he sat in a courtroom, wore a robe, and signed an outlandish order.

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